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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
ENEMY ALIEN LITIGANTS IN THE ENGLISH LA.-It is said that as a
general rule an enemy alien cannot bring an action in the English courts.
"And true it is, that an Alien enemie, shall maintaine neither reall nor per-
sonall action, Donec terrae fuet' communes, that is untill both Nations be
in peace." CoKE oN LiTTLXToN, (2 ed.) L. 2, c. ii, sec. x98. LoRD STOWEL,'S
famous dictum in The Hoop (1799), I C. Rob. I96, 200, is regarded as a
classical statement of the doctrine: "In the law of almost every country, the
character of alien enemy carries with it a disability to sue, or to sustain in
the language of the civilians a persona standi in judicio. The peculiar law
of our own country applies this principle with great rigour.-The same prin-
ciple is received in our courts of the law of nations; they are so far British
courts, that no man can sue therein who is a subject of the enemy, unless
under particular circumstances that pro hac vice discharge him from the char-
acter of an enemy; such as his coming under a flag of truce, a cartel, a pass,
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or some other act of public authority that puts him in the King's peace pro
hdc vice." Perhaps the most useful recent discussion of the law on this ques-
tion is to be found in the opinion of Loa CHIEF JusTicn RE.ADING in Porter
v. Freudenberg [I9151, i K. B. 857, 866. There is an exhaustive review of
the authorities in Rodriguez v. Speyer Brothers (i9i8), 88 L. J. K. B. 147,
discussed infra. See also i6 MIcH. L. Rtv. 621. For a comparative study of
the law and practice of different countries, see GARNER, "TtrATM NT OF
ENEmY ALIENS," 13 AM. Joua. OF INT. LAW 22-59.
The general rule has been deprived of much of its original significance
by the progressive tendency of the courts to mitigate the harshness of its ap-
plication. It is applied, for example, only to parties plaintiff. An enemy alien
may be sued as a defendant, and when sued he has a right to enter an appear-
ance and defend the action. Robinson & Co. v. Continental Insurance Com-
pany of Mannheim [I915], 1 K. B. 155. If the decision goes against him he
has a right to appeal. Porter v. Freudenberg, supra. As applied to parties
plaintiff the principle is qualified by many important exceptions. LoRD Sro-
WELT, suggested that an enemy alien might be discharged from his enemy
character pro hac vice if he entered the realm under a flag of truce, a cartel,
a pass, or some other act of public authority capable of putting him in the
King's peace. The Hoop, supra. In the case of The M~we (1914), 84 L. J.
P. 57, SM SAMU I EVANS laid down the rule that an enemy alien claiming
any protection, privilege, or relief under the Hague Conventions of 1907
should be entitled to appear as claimant and argue his claim before the prize
court. There is considerable authority for the proposition that an enemy
alien may sue en autre droit, e.g., as administrator or executor. Richfield v.
Udal (1679), Carter 48, 191; 1 WIlLIAmS ON EXECUTORS, (6 Am. ed.) 269,
27o note. In at least one instance an enemy alien has been admitted to prove
a debt under a commission of bankruptcy in order to protect his right to a
dividend. Ex parte Boussnaker (i8o6), 13 Ves. 71. By all odds the most
important exception is the rule, long established, that an enemy alien may
sue in the King's courts if he is in the realm by license of the crown. Wells
v. Williams (1697), i Ld. Raym. 282; i BAC. ABR., (5 ed.) 83; 84. License
may be either express or implied. It was implied from the fact of registra-
tion under the Aliens Registration Act and Order of 1914. Princess Thurn
and Taxis v. Moffitt [1915], I Ch. 58. And the license implied from such
registration was not revoked but on the contrary was strengthened by in-
ternment. Schaffenius v. Goldberg [1916], I K. B. 284. It has been sug-
gested that license would probably be implied from the circumstance that an
enemy alien, in pursuance of prescribed procedure, had applied for and been
granted exemption from internment on condition. Picclroo, 27 YALE, LAw
Joum. i69. In brief, it would seem that, as regards enemy subjects residing
or carrying on business in the realm, the number to whom the courts are
closed under modern conditions has become almost negligible.
As regards enemy subjects residing or carrying on business in other coum-
tries, it is by no means universally true that they are denied a persona standi
in judicio. In the first place, the test of enemy character is place of residence
or business rather than nationality. Porter v. Freudenberg, supra. See 16
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Mic. L. Riv. 256. Thus an action has been maintained by a partnership
carrying on business in an allied country, although one of the partners was
an enemy subject residing in an allied or neutral country. In re Mary Duch-
ess of Sutherland (I915), 31 T. L. R. 248, 394. See Janson v. Driefontein
Consolidated Mines Ltd. i9O2], A. C. 484, 505. In the second place, enemy
subjects residing or carrying on business in an enemy country may some-
times be joined as co-plaintiffs as a matter of form where the action in sub-
stance is brought to protect the rights of English subjects. In Mercedes
Daimler Motor Co. v. Maudslay Motor Co. (1915), 31 T. L. R. 178, a patent
had been vested jointly in an English company and a German company by
a deed which provided that the English company should have the sole right
of bringing actions for infringement and might jbin the German company
in such actions as co-plaintiff. An action was allowed to proceed in the name
of the two companies on the ground that it was in substance for the protec-
tion of the English company. In Roinbacl. Baden. Clock Co. v. Gent & Son
(1915), 84 L. J. K. B. 1558, a German subject resident in Germany and his
two sons, one ac German subject resident in England, and the other a natural-
ised Englishman, had carried on a partnership business in England. After
the outbreak of war the naturalised Englishman commenced proceedings for
dissolution and was appointed receiver. He was permitted in the principal
case to bring in action in the name of the firm to recover a debt due the
partnership.
The significance of the recent decision of the House of Lords in Rodri-
guez v. Speyer Brotlers (1918), 88 L. J. K. B. 147, may be adequately appre-
ciated in the light of the authorities reviewed above. In this case the plain-
tiff firm was. a partnership of six persons one of whom was a German sub-
ject resident in Germany. The firm -had carried on a banking business in
London before the outbreak of war. The dissolution of the firm by the out-
break of war made it necessary to get in the assets and wind up the part-
nership affairs. An action was brought in the name of the firm to recover
a debt due from the defendant. Judgment was signed against the defendant
in default of appearance. It was attempted to have this judgment set aside
on the ground that one of the plaintiffs was an enemy alien and so incompe-
tent to sue in the King's courts. The House of Lords decided, by a vote
of three to two, that the rule against the bringing of actions by enemy aliens
did not apply.
The majority recognized the general rule. "There is no doubt that, as a
general rule, an alien enemy cannot bring an action in the King's Courts as
plaintiff, although he may, of course, be made a defendant. The rule seems
to have its origin in two considerations. First, that the subject of a country
then at war with the King is, in this country, unless he be here with the
King's permission, ex-lex, and that he cannot come into the King's Courts
to sue any more than could an outlaw; and, secondly, that the King's Courts
will give no assistance to proceedings which, if successful, would lead to the
enrichment of an enemy alien and therefore would tend to provide his country
with the sinews of war." Per Lo"e CHAN cILOR FINqLAY, 88 L. J. K. B. 147,
:51. The general rule was conceived by the majority to rest fundamentally
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upon public policy. VISCOUNT HALDANE pointed out that courts are guided
by public policy in applying rules of at least three different types. (I) the
public policy involved may never have crystallised into a definite or exhaustive
set of propositions and will control only where the particular circumstances
disclose the mischief which the policy seeks to prevent, e.g., the rule as to
wagers in the days when wagers were enforced; (2) the public policy in-
volved may have partially precipitated itself into definite rules of law but
the rules have remained subject to the moulding influence of the real reasons
of policy from which they proceeded, e.g., the rule as to covenants in re-
straint of trade; (3) the public policy involved may have become completely
crystallised in definite and exhaustive rules of law which can be changed
only by statute, e.g., the rule against perpetuities. The Lords were divided
in opinion as to whether the general rule that an enemy alien cannot sue in
the King's courts should be placed in the second or in the third category
above. LORD CHANCELLOR FINLAY, VISCOUNT HALDANE, and LORD PARMOOR
held the opinion that it should be placed in the second category. Conse-
quently, when confronted with a situation in which the application of the
rule would have done more harm to British subjects or friendly neutrals than
to the enemy, they found no difficulty in recognizing an exception and permit-
ting the enemy alien to be joined as a co-plaintiff in order to get in the part-
nership assets. The "balance of public convenience" was distinctly in favor
of making an exception to the general rule.
LORD ATKINSON and LORD SumNER, on the other hand, regarded the rule
as belonging to the third category. In their opinion the enemy alien's in-
capacity to sue is a well established personal disability depending neither
upon the nature of his claim nor upon the result of his suit, if successful,
in enriching him or benefiting his country. "This rule of our law, like many
other of our rules of law, was, no doubt, originally based upon and embodied
certain views of public policy; but in this case, as in many others, the prin-
ciples of public policy so adopted have, as numerous authorities conclusively
show, crystallised, as it were, into strict and rigid rules of law to be applied,
to use LoRD STowEL's words, 'with rigour.' If that be so, as I think it
clearly is, then the cases establish that it is wholly illegitimate for any judi-
cial tribunal, which may disapprove of the principles of public policy so em-
bodied in the rigid rule, to disregard that rule in any particular case and base
its decision on other principles of public policy of which it more approves.
To do so would be to usurp the prerogative and powers of the Legislature,
since it is the function of the Legislature, not of judicial tribunals, to dis-
card the principles embodied in such rules, and in its enactments embody
others which it prefers." Per LORD ATKINSON, 88 L. J. K. B. 147, 163. "I
think that it would be difficult to find another rule so little qualified over so
many centuries. When first we hear of it, not long after the beginning of
recorded decisions, it was already clear. We never find it emerging from
doubt into certainty under the influence of successive decisions, if that is what
is meant by 'crystallising'; it has always been as certain as language could
make it, as curt as the Commandments. It has never been doubted; the
current of decision has run strong and steady and always the same way. It
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has always been a rule of personal disability." Per' LoRD SUmNER, 88 L. J.
K. B. 147, 176.
LoRD SuLmnZR'S choice of a metaphor was not exactly a happy one. In
the light of the authorities reviewed briefly at the beginning of this note,
it would seem that the ancient rule as to enemy alien litigants could have
been more appropriately presented as an obstruction which has been yielding
gradually to the eroding current of a more liberal principle. Looking at the
question from this point of view, the real significance of the decision ien-
dered by the majority in Rodriguez v. Speyer Brothers becomes apparent.
Not only does the decision-add another exception of considerable importance
to a rule that is already well on the way to being engulfed in its exceptions,
but it establishes beyond peradventure that the rule is not rigid and that it
remains subject to the moulding influence of the real reasons of public policy
from which it has proceeded. In effect, the eroding process is approved and
may continue unobstructed in the future.
E. D. D.
